may readily be grown in tissue cultures and infect guinea pigs and rodents in the laboratory.
Epidemiology LCM infections of humans may cause influenza-like disease, meningoencephalitis, or aseptic meningitis. Although LCM virus can often cause severe disease, deaths are rare. LCM viruses have been estimated to cause nearly 8 percent of the acute central nervous system infections of virus etiology, but incidence of the disease may vary considerably in various geographical locations. In the U.S.A. it is thought to be far lower than 8 percent, although precise figures are not available. In recent years 181 proven human LCM infections were associated with pet hamsters in the United States [9] .
Epidemics of Junin virus disease (Argentine hemorrhagic fever) were recognized in the early 1950s in the farming regions northwest of Buenos Aires [1] . The disease is now recognized as endemic for an area five times that originally believed to be affected. The disease is characterized by an acute febrile period followed by renal, hematological, neurological, and cardiovascular changes. There is little evidence of subclinical infections. The more severe forms of the disease, associated with hemorrhagic manifestations, convulsions, profuse bleedings, and shock, are less common. The case mortality rate is 10-20 percent. In nonfatal cases convalescence may be slow, with patients suffering fatigue for many weeks. Several hundred cases of Junin virus infections are reported each year in Argentina, but the number of cases may vary, depending on climatic and other ecological factors.
Machupo virus disease (Bolivian hemorrhagic fever) clinically resembles Junin virus infections, with malaise, fever, headache, and myalgia. Like infections with Junin virus, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever has a case fatality rate of 10-20 percent [2] . The number of cases annually of Bolivian hemorrhagic fever initially reported was similar to that for Junin virus, but cases decreased drastically after a rodent control program was initiated [2] .
Lassa fever may clinically resemble Argentine or Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, but severe Lassa fever virus infections often cause liver disease, pneumonia, myocarditis, and a host of other complications, including permanent neurological deafness [3] . Large amounts of virus may circulate in the blood of patients for several weeks after disease onset, in spite of the development of virus-specific antibodies. The case fatality rate for Lassa fever was originally reported to average 50-60 percent but the rate is now conceded to be less than half that with the increasing recognition of less specific symptomatology. No reliable figures are available on the total incidence of Lassa fever, but present evidence indicates that the disease occurs in large areas in the plateau regions of West Africa [10] .
Arenaviruses are maintained in nature through persistent or long-term infections of various rodent species. LCM virus is most frequently associated with Mus musculus, Lassa fever virus with Mastomys natalensis in West Africa, Machupo virus with Calomys callosus in Bolivia, and Junin virus with at least three different cricetine rodent species in Argentina [5] . Humans are accidental hosts with infection occurring through a complex rodent-virus transmission pattern. Primary route of transmission to humans is generally thought to occur through contamination of food, water, or air by rodents, primarily through urine, or by inoculation of excreta through skin abrasions. Humans are infected primarily through infected rodents invading human habitats [10] . The exception is Junin virus infection, which is an occupational hazard among agricultural workers in the corn fields of Argentina at harvest time. The precise mechanism of Junin virus transmission is unknown.
Only Lassa fever virus appears to have the characteristic ability for human-tohuman transmission. Nosocomial cycles of infection in remote West African hospitals have been well documented. Secondary spread may also occur among members of household groups, but it is difficult to differentiate between human transmission and single-source infections [10] .
Each of these four arenaviruses represent a significant hazard to laboratory workers, and all should be handled only under strict conditions of containment.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Arenaviruses in general may be isolated and identified from blood, throat washings, urine, or specimens taken from lung or visceral organs at autopsy [8] . The preferred method of identification of arenaviruses is by fluorescent antibody (FA) test [11] . Although the virus may be identified directly in tissue specimens, the most successful method of rapid identification is the inoculation of virus into Vero cell cultures; the virus can then be identified by FA test within three days after the inoculation. The indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) test is preferred for serologic diagnosis of arenaviruses. It is less time-consuming and more sensitive than the complement fixation (CF) test. Serologic diagnosis may be made on paired sera collected during acute and convalescent phases of the illness. By the IFA test, antibodies may be detected in Lassa fever patients as early as the second week of illness and may reach a peak one to two weeks later [11] . CF antibodies are usually much slower in development and may not be detected until the third or fourth week after onset of illness. Although there is some known antigenic crossing, IFA tests on sera from convalescent patients are diagnostic of Lassa fever and LCM virus infections [12] . Junin and Machupo viruses are so closely related that a highly specific neutralization test is necessary for differentiation.
Treatment and Control
There are no vaccines available for the arenaviruses. Plasma from convalescent patients has been used to treat patients severely ill with Lassa, Bolivan, or Argentinian hemorrhagic fevers. Some evidence suggests that high titered plasma may be efficacious during the first week of disease [3] , but no control studies have been done.
The key to the control of arenavirus infections of humans is the reduction of the opportunity for exposure to the reservoir-vector rodent [10] . Rodent control has been highly successful in curtailing Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. Studies in West Africa are now under way to determine if rodent control may also reduce human disease with Lassa fever virus. However, control of Junin virus through rodent control in the wild may be a much more difficult task. Vaccines, of course, would be useful for protection of personnel who are at highest risk of infection with arenaviruses, such as farm workers in Argentina, and hospital, laboratory, and staff personnel in the Lassa fever endemic areas of West Africa.
AFRICAN HEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUSES This term has been used to describe Marburg and Ebola viruses, both of which appear to originate in Africa.
Marburg and Ebola viruses are morphologically similar but antigenically distinct [13] . Both viruses are seen under the electron microscope (EM) as medium-sized, elongated, filamentous or tubular forms, with branching and other bizarre configurations. These viruses may superficially resemble rhabdoviruses by EM, but the bizarre morphological forms are shared with no other known virus group. Both are RNA viruses. Marburg and Ebola viruses may be differentiated in a laboratory by FA tests with specific antisera. Epidemiology
The first recognition of Marburg virus disease was in 1967 when it caused outbreaks among 31 persons in Marburg and Frankfurt, Germany, and Belgrade, Yugoslavia [4] . Twenty-five of the cases were among laboratory workers who had been in direct contact with infected monkeys imported from Uganda. Seven patients died. A second outbreak of Marburg virus occurred in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1975, apparently as a result of the index case contracting the disease in Rhodesia [13] .
The first outbreak of Ebola virus disease was recognized in the fall of 1976 in Northern Zaire and Southern Sudan [14] . The outbreak involved an estimated 500 cases and 350 deaths.
Differential diagnosis of a disease in a patient in Central Africa or in someone having just returned from a tour of the bush in the same region may be difficult, since infections with either of the viruses at certain stages of disease may resemble Lassa fever, malaria, typhoid fever, or yellow fever [ 15] . A sudden onset of fever, headache, and malaise, followed by chest discomfort, diarrhea, and vomiting, in a patient with a history of travel to rural Central Africa should alert the physician to consider Marburg or Ebola virus infections in making a differential diagnosis.
The reservoirs of Marburg and Ebola viruses are not known. Because the original outbreak of Marburg virus disease was associated with contact of laboratory workers with infected vervet monkeys, the disease was initially described as the "green monkey disease," but monkeys are probably accidental hosts, along with humans. Extensive studies of insects, rodents, snakes, and primates from the area in which the index case of Marburg disease in South Africa was assumed to have become infected failed to reveal any evidence of the virus [13] . However, the outbreaks of the disease in Marburg, Germany, and South Africa have demonstrated that person-to-person transmission of the virus can occur through close contact, although this route of infection is probably not an effective or common one.
No nonhuman vectors were incriminated in the investigations of the Ebola epidemic in the Sudan and Zaire, and the source of the original infection has not been determined. Infection seemed to spread only as a result of close contact with an infected person. In Zaire, where the case fatality rate was much higher than in the Sudan, parenteral injections with contaminated equipment played a major role in transmission. Patients infected in the hospital environment appeared to have carried the infection back to the villages [14] .
Laboratory Diagnosis
Because of the potential for spread of fatal infections among household and medical personnel, a laboratory diagnosis of Marburg or Ebola virus infections must be made rapidly [13] . A rapid presumptive diagnosis can be made by EM by recognizing the characteristic virus morphology in liver and serum specimens and by specific FA in liver cell suspensions. Both viruses may be isolated from blood and throat specimens through inoculation of Vero cells or interperitoneal inoculation of guinea pigs. Both viruses may be identified in Vero cells by FA or EM within three or four days after inoculation. Serologic diagnosis of Marburg and Ebola infection may be made during late stages of the disease or during the convalescence period by CF and fluorescent antibody test [13] . All laboratory procedures should be carried out only in maximum containment facilities.
Treatment and Control
No vaccines are available for protection against Marburg or Ebola viruses. As with the arenaviruses, there is some suggestion that plasma from convalescent patients may be helpful during early stages of the disease. Outbreaks may be controlled through quarantine of infected persons [15] .
MONKEYPOX VIRUS INFECTIONS IN MAN
The last naturally occurring case of smallpox was recorded in Merka Town, Somalia, in October 1977. The eradication of smallpox is, indeed, a tribute to international cooperation in public health [16] . The principles on which the global smallpox eradication program were based were that humans are the only natural hosts and the only vectors of variola, that no carrier status exists, and that vaccination can provide virtually complete protection. From the success of the program to date, it would appear that these principles are valid [17] . However, some questions still remain. Will smallpox reappear from hidden foci in remote populations? Is there a danger of infection from variola virus from inanimate objects? Are there possible animal reservoirs of variola or variola-like virus? Will other animal poxviruses fill the ecological niche left by the eradication of smallpox? Finally, are we risking defeat of the smallpox eradication program by maintaining variola virus strains in laboratories? Experience to date by the WHO suggests that the probability of smallpox reappearing from unrecognized foci in human populations is remote. Smallpox has not reappeared in any country after having been certified as smallpox-free [17] .
It is also unlikely that smallpox will reappear as a result of reactivation of virus from inanimate objects. Although there have been anecdotal reports of contaminated blankets and crusts being infectious for years, present evidence suggests that, in the tropical areas where contaminated objects were most likely to be found, the scabs were rendered noninfectious in less than a month. Furthermore, evidence is also strong that all of the outbreaks investigated over the past 12 years have been epidemiologically linked with a known human case [16] .
It is premature to rule out the possible survival of variola or variola-like viruses in animal reservoirs. Some cause for concern arises from the so-called wild whitepox strains, which have been isolated from a chimpanzee, a wild monkey, and two rodents in Zaire, as well as from cynomolgus kidney cell cultures in a European laboratory. Biologically these strains cannot be distinguished from variola virus. The significance of these viruses is not clear [16] .
Of immediate concern, however, is the increasing recognition of the occurrence of monkeypox infection of humans. As smallpox has been eliminated, an increasing number of monkeypox infections among humans have been recognized. From 1970 to 1979, 44 cases of monkeypox have been reported from the tropical rain forest regions of West and Central Africa. The disease closely resembles smallpox, with a case fatality rate of 10-15 percent [16] . However, there is only limited evidence of human-to-human transmission. Some of those infected had received smallpox vaccination as late as five years before. All cases occurred in areas of small villages where people are hunters and frequently contact a variety of wild animals. Present evidence suggests that the name "monkeypox" is a misnomer and that monkeys, like humans, are accidental hosts. Monkeypox viruses have never been isolated in the wild, alhtough a low prevalence of orthopoxvirus neutralizing antibodies has been demonstrated in nonhuman primates in those areas where human monkeypox cases have been reported.
Variants of monkeypox virus which biologically resemble smallpox can be isolated in the laboratory. These findings have raised questions as to whether monkeypox could be a progenitor of smallpox. Work is presently under way to investigate the DNA characteristics to determine more precisely the genetic relationship of these variants to smallpox, but at this point monkeypox virus is not considered to be a significant threat.
Finally, a word about the retention of smallpox viruses in laboratories. The recent experience in Birmingham, England, where primary and secondary cases of smallpox were associated with a virus laboratory, serves to remind us that smallpox infections may occur if laboratory safety conditions are inadequate [18] . The WHO has made strict recommendations for laboratory facilities where the virus is maintained and have urged all countries without such facilities to destroy the virus. The WHO has designated three laboratories as smallpox centers: Institute of Viral Preparations, Moscow; National Institute for Medical Research, London; and CDC, Atlanta. Retention of the smallpox strains is required for rapid comparative studies on newly emerged variants or isolates which may resemble smallpox virus.
OTHER EXOTIC VIRAL DISEASES Although not considered potential public health problems in the U.S., hemorrhagic fever with viral syndrome, Crimean/Congo hemorrhagic fever, and Rocio encephalitis should be added to the list of exotic viral diseases recognized in the last 25 years.
Hemorrhagic fever with viral syndrome (HFRS) occurs over wide areas of Korea, China, U.S.S.R., and Finland. The virus associated with this disease in Korea was isolated for the first time in 1978 [19] . Like the arenaviruses, the virus of HFRS occurs in small rodents and is presumably transmitted to man through rodent excreta. There is no evidence of person-to-person transmission. Crimean hemorrhagic fever has been known to be caused by a virus since 1945, but only more recently has it been characterized and shown to be similar to the Congo virus from Africa [20] . The member of the Bunyaviridae family causes epidemics in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union and sporadic cases in Pakistan and East Africa. The disease is associated with tick-biting activity, primarily of the Hyalomma genus. Mortality may range between 3 and 30 percent. Nosocomial outbreaks among hospital personnel have occurred in Pakistan and the Soviet Union.
Rocio encephalitis was first recognized in 1975 in epidemic form in Sao Paulo State, Brazil [21] . The case fatality ranged from 5-25 percent. Rocio virus is a group B arbovirus and, as such, has the potential to spread to other areas.
